Nobody can accuse Labor's defence team, Minister Richard Marles and Defence Industry Minister Pat Conroy, of not hitting the ground running.
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Or perhaps more to the point is that they didn't get where they are today without a good understanding of the way the media works and how it can be used to amplify a message over the New Year's holidays.
Because that's exactly what they achieved last week with the announcement the army's acquiring an unspecified number of the deadly, long-range, land-based and truck-mounted High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) that have been used to such devastating effect against the Russians in Ukraine.
The news is just as exciting and relevant today as it was when the details of the purchase were first announced by the US in May last year.
While indicating (last week) that the deal would cost between $1-2 billion dollars, Conroy was insisting the reason he wouldn't disclose specific amounts "is that gives information to potential adversaries which isn't useful beaming out there."
This statement displays such a lovely naivety about national security that it's disappointing to reveal to the minister that a simple subscription to Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter would provide all such prospective enemies with the exact number of weapons systems we're buying - and it's 20.
APDR editor Kym Bergman says the buy includes "20 M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS); 30 M30A2 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS); 30 Alternative Warhead (AW) Pods with Insensitive Munitions Propulsion Systems (IMPS) and 30 M31A2 GMLRS Unitary (GMLRS-U) High Explosive Pods with IMPS".
Bergman continued with his inventory ("30 XM403 Extended Range (ER)-GMLRS AW Pods; 30 EM404 ER GMLRS Unitary Pods") but I'm afraid I'd rather lost interest by this time, wondering instead why Conroy pretended he couldn't reveal details that were so readily available.
Had he simply been duped by some defence bureaucrat urging silence, or did the minister really not understand how these things worked?
The reason the HIMARS purchase was a so much better story last week than the year before is, of course, because it's been used to such devastating effect in Ukraine. People understand what the weapon can do and that's why Marles and Conroy broke into the holidays to make the announcement.
Hyping up this purchase has given the government an opportunity to look tough on national security - and it's successfully seizing it with both hands.
Back when Stephen Smith was minister and Julia Gillard prime minister, Labor slashed defence spending in the wake of the GFC. This was exactly the right thing to do in that period, but the times have changed. In a couple of months Smith and (former) Air Marshal Angus Houston will be handing down their strategic review, which will detail a new direction and spending plan for equipment.
That's why getting in early with a soft story like the HIMARS purchase is such a smart move. It begins preparing the ground for the release of the review, shaping the narrative on defence.
What makes this so (politically) smart is that it directly undermines Peter Dutton's legitimacy. He was the former minister responsible for this area, which means that any weaknesses in the force structure - and let's face it, there are always problems in defence - will be attributed to him.
You can almost hear Anthony Albanese already clearing his throat as he gets ready to launch into the hapless Opposition Leader, insisting that it's the Liberals who can't be trusted to protect the country.
The PM has already made it quite clear that he is quite prepared to fight the next election on this ground, even though national security is territory that Labor normally vacates. This is not just good policy - it's good strategy.
By strengthening its reputation in this area Labor will gain not simply by repositioning itself; it will also be directly undermining one of the Coalition's major strengths and setting it on the back foot.
It's important, however, to put this political shadow-boxing aside and look at the deeper meaning behind this announcement. It shows we're living in a very different world to the one of just a few years ago, confirming that the last war will be no guide to the next.
HIMARS technology isn't, in itself, new. Singapore's 23rd Artillery Battalion has been equipped with 18 for more than a decade.
I witnessed the devastating effect rockets achieved at Mosul in 2016 as a section harboured next to an Iraqi headquarters I reported from. Its conceptual birth can be traced back to a need originally identified by 9th (US) Infantry Division in the 1980s, as it experimented with a new, light and non armour-based force structure, similar to Australia's army today.
The system can now accurately deliver precision strike at a range of up to 500 kilometres, switching between high explosive or using flechette warheads to scatter deadly anti-personnel munitions.
The distance and accuracy of its missiles make it a decision-maker: the nature of battle is changing.
Information becomes vital, from knowledge of enemy positions, possession of a GPS system allowing accurate engagement, and a smooth system allowing resupply are now the new factors deciding victory.
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An enormous Russian effort to destroy Ukraine's' HIMARS has failed (as of December) and the missiles aren't missing. Last week a pinpoint attack destroyed a resting Russian unit behind the lines. Nowhere is safe.
Twenty years ago there was a lot of talk about a revolution in military affairs. At the time this was premature. Today it's not. In his book War Transformed former Major-General (and head of the Australian Defence College) Mick Ryan examines key trends shaping this new form of warfare.
Critically, Ryan insists the key factor will not be (simply) technical - possessing particular weapons systems - but adaptability and flexibility allowing organisational evolution.
Unfortunately, rigid institutions such as armies aren't naturally suited to implementing the sort of deep change in thinking that is necessary to accommodate the changing face of battle.
The lessons of Ukraine's war are there for all to see. Making sense of what they mean will require far more than purchasing a handful of weapons. It requires change.
- Nicholas Stuart is editor of ability.news and a regular columnist.